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Shifting Strategies: the Pursuit of Closure and the ‘Association of German Auditors’ 
Abstract 
Drawing on Weber’s (1972) theories of social stratification and closure, and on Parkin’s 
(1979) development thereof, this paper contributes a case study of Germany to the literature 
on closure processes (rather than outcomes), and outcomes falling short of 
professionalization. It explores the early history of the first German association of auditors, 
the Verband Deutscher Bücherrevisoren (VDB), founded in 1896. The paper traces how 
closure was pursued, at various times, by different means and to different degrees, depending 
on the changing social, economic and political contexts and on changing perception of what 
would best serve the association’s interest. By thus focusing on the shifting aims and 
strategies of the VDB, the paper contributes new insights into the dynamics within 
professions and between professions and their environments, and the dynamics and 
conditions underlying failed professionalization projects. The paper shows that, while the 
VDB had a degree of success in creating many of the structure and processes of a modern 
professional body, its ambition to achieve market and professional closure was not fulfilled.  
Key words: auditors, professions, Germany, closure 
Introduction 
One major approach in the sociology of professions builds on neo-Weberian theories of 
closure and social stratification. Closure theory suggests that professions seek to ‘translate 
one order of scarce resources – specialist knowledge and skills – into another – social and 
economic rewards’ (Larson, 1977/2013, p. xvii). Based mainly on the work of German 
sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920), closure and stratification theories have been developed 
and employed primarily in the context of Anglo-American professions (see for example, 
Collins, 1975; Larson, 1977/2013; Macdonald, 1995; Murphy, 1988; Parkin, 1979). While 
there is thus a considerable body of literature on histories also of the accounting profession in 
Anglo-American setting, such studies outside the English-speaking world are in much shorter 
supply. Exceptions include papers on Belgium, France, Greece and Italy (see for example 
Ballas, 1998; Bocqueraz, 2001; De Beelde, 2002; Caramanis, 1997, 2005; Coronella, 
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Sargiacomo & Walker, 2015; Dedoulis & Caramanis, 2007; Ramirez, 2001) and, to a limited 
extent, Germany (see below). Where such papers also draw on neo-Weberian theories, they 
suggest that the theories require refining to allow for national political, social, economic, 
legal and historical contexts (Burrage, 1988; Chua & Poullaos, 1993, 1998; Macdonald, 
1995, p. 63; Ramirez, 2001; Willmott, 1986). Since closure can be achieved through a variety 
of processes and may be pursued to varying degrees, broader conceptualizations of closure 
and monopoly may be required (Chua & Poullaos, 1998, p. 156). It has also been suggested 
that neo-Weberian studies of professionalization place too much emphasis on the the role of 
the professions, vis-à-vis other actors (Chua & Poullaos, 1993). Continental European 
settings in particular seem to suggest that the state plays a central role (Burrage, Jarausch & 
Siegrist 1990; Caramanis, 1999; Macdonald, 1995; Ramirez, 2001; Sikka & Willmott, 1995), 
although professional initiatives often existed before state intervention – as in France 
(Bocqueraz, 2001), and in Germany. The present paper examines the early history of the 
Verband Deutscher Bücherrevisoren (VDB), the first German association of auditors, 
between 1896 and 1914, long before state control of auditing. In particular, the paper tracks 
and interprets the VDB’s largely unsuccessful attempts, by various means and to various 
extents, to obtain, for its members, market and social closure for audit and accounting related 
activities. As an interpretative frame I draw primarily on Weber’s original texts (1972, 5th 
edition, in German), supplemented by Parkin’s (1979) theory of dual closure.  
Parkin (1979, p. 44) argues that refinements of Weber’s theories, in particular a more 
explicit link between stratification and closure, make his concepts more useful ‘for the study 
of class and similar forms of structured inequality’. To create such a more explicit link, 
Parkin develops the concept of dual closure: closure as exclusion of ‘groups or classes legally 
defined as inferiors’ (p. 45) and closure as usurpation, by those excluded, of the privileges 
and resources of dominant groups. Related to this, Parkin’s model places greater emphasis on 
the role of the state than Weber does, thus also addressing the limitation of neo-Weberian 
literature referred to above. Parkin argues, for example, that exclusionary closure strategies 
usually seek the support of the state, while usurpationary closure tends to rely on solidaristic 
strategies (1979, p. 98; 2002, pp. 101–102). Parkin thus interprets and extends Weber’s 
writings in a way that allows me to make sense of the role of the state in the history of the 
VDB, while nonetheless respecting Weber’s original text.  
Drawing, in addition to Parkin (1979), also on Weber’s original writings adds further 
insights to the case presented in this paper, and has potential also do so in the exploration of 
other professionalization attempts, in particular in continental Europe. Thus, while 
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recognizing that status groups and social classes seek similar rewards and at times use similar 
strategies, Parkin’s (1979) critique of Marxist class theory is predominately concerned with 
the closure strategies of classes. Weber however explores in more depth the interplay 
between status/social standing and economic resources (see also Harrits, 2014). As will be 
discussed below, this – and the associated concepts of Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft 
(approximately: ‘society’ and ‘community’, but see below) – permit a deeper examination of 
the VDB’s objectives and strategies. In addition, Weber’s original concepts of closure and 
monopoly, and associated strategies, are not as tightly defined as they appear in later (neo-
Weberian) professions literature, and thus invite the finer distinctions between different types 
and levels of closure called for by Chua and Poullaos (1993). 
Weber witnessed and theorized about the changing social, economic and political 
context that saw the emergence of the VDB and its pursuit of closure.1 Social developments 
observed and critiqued by Weber – for example, the changing role of formal credentials – had 
a major impact on the association. This is reflected in the fact that the terms and concepts 
employed by Weber are frequently echoed in the language of the VDB (as, for example, the 
term Stand and its compounds). Drawing on the original text, in the original language, thus 
permits me to identify synchronicity between the theoretical concepts and the discourse and 
rhetoric of the VDB, which illustrates how both arose from and within the same cultural 
context. This allows for a more nuanced interpretation of the case, since language and 
discourses play an important part of the data in the context of this and related papers.  
The use of the original text is also useful because several of the concepts employed by 
Weber are difficult to translate, and translations have become outdated (Kalberg, 2001; 
Waters & Waters, 2010). For example, translations of the German term Stand as ‘status 
group’ only approximate the German meaning, and translations of the terms Gemeinschaft 
and Gesellschaft, as ‘community’, ‘political community’ or ‘group’, and ‘society’ or 
‘societal, respectively, do not fully capture the complexity and context of Weber’s 
terminology. However, the concepts are central to Weber’s theory of stratification (Waters & 
Waters, 2010). Similar difficulties arise over translating the term Beruf (approximately: 
‘occupation’, ‘vocation’), while, conversely, the English ‘profession’ does not have a German 
equivalent (see below). Except where citing other authors, I therefore leave several German 
terms untranslated and instead explain their meaning (see for example notes 4 and 5).  
The paper aims to contribute to prior research in a number of (interconnected) ways. 
While much of the earlier literature on professionalization focuses on successful projects and 
on formal structures of association and closure, the present paper contributes to the more 
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limited literature on closure processes (rather than outcomes) and on incomplete professional 
projects, that is, outcomes falling short of professionalization. For nascent professions, ‘there 
are clearly a variety of directions for development, and development towards strong control is 
but one of them’ (Abbott, 1988, p. 18). Focusing on the shifting aims and strategies of 
historical actors, and tracking the life and ‘death’ of different closure strategies, permits the 
exploration of their interaction, their efficacy, and the preference, at different socio-historical 
junctures, for different types of strategies (Chua & Poullaos, 1993, 1998). Supporting Chua 
and Poullaos, and in line with Weber’s original texts, the present case illustrates that different 
degrees of market control or closure may be pursued at various times, and that the strategies 
and resources employed may change (see also, for example, Richardson, 1997; Walker, 1995, 
2004). Professions do not exist in isolation; they ‘are not autonomous objects that exist 
“there”, waiting to be studied’ (Ramirez 2001, p. 414). Instead, professionalization projects 
are idiosyncratic processes, strongly driven by the respective social, political and cultural 
conditions.  
Secondly, and following from this, the paper contributes to historical explorations of 
the conditions underlying unsuccessful professionalization projects by presenting a case 
study of Germany in the decades preceding World War I – a period of considerable social, 
economic and political change, and in which third parties, and in particular the state, played a 
significant role. The paper thus adds to insights provided by previous studies with a similar 
focus on processes and contexts (as for example Chua & Poullaos, 1993, 1998; Ramirez, 
2001, and Coronella et al., 2015) by exploring a new context.2 While other aspects of the 
development of the German audit profession have been explored to some extent elsewhere 
(Evans, 2003, 2005; Evans & Honold, 2007; Gietzmann & Quick, 1998; Markus, 1997; 
Meisel, 1992; Quick, 1990, 2005; Vieten, 1995), this paper is, to the best of my knowledge, 
the first, in accounting, that explores in depth the history of the foundation and early years of 
the first German association of auditors, and the first applying the theoretical lens discussed 
above.  
Thus, the paper’s third contribution is its combination of Parkin’s concept of dual 
closure with Weber’s original texts. Prior papers tend to draw on either Weber (Chua & 
Poullaos, 1993 and 1998) or Parkin (Coronella et al., 2015).3 While Parkin usefully develops 
Weber’s theories of stratification and closure (as discussed above), drawing in addition on 
Weber can contribute deeper insights into the interplay and tensions between closure and 
openness. Thus, for example, Weber identifies the need for associations, at specific junctures, 
to pursue openness rather than closure, but this is ‘sometimes forgotten by neo-Weberian 
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studies of the professions’ (Chua & Poullaos, 1998, p. 182). The present paper reminds us of 
these original insights and draws upon them for a more refined exploration of the pursuit of 
status honour and market interests by means of different levels of closure and openness at 
different times. This also permits a more nuanced examination of the interplay between 
expansionist and monopolistic (Weber) and exclusionary and usurpationary (Parkin) 
strategies. While this approach may be particularly useful for the specific setting explored in 
this paper, drawing more closely on Weber – with refinements perhaps necessitated by 
contexts – may also provide fresh perspectives on other settings.  
Finally, and more tentatively, the paper suggests that the application of a sociological 
theoretical framework developed in the same setting as the case to be explored may give rise 
to additional insights, in particular in the case of a history project. Thus it reduces the risk of 
‘lifting historical subjects outside their contexts’ (Mills, 1993, p. 801), that may apply when 
drawing on modern theoretical frameworks. As argued above, other benefits arise because 
drawing on the original text may provide insights that may otherwise be ‘lost in translation’. 
The implications of translation are of course generally well understood (with regard to 
Weber, see Kalberg, 2001; Waters & Waters, 2010) and a contribution in this respect can 
only be claimed for the case under investigation. However, while many neo-Weberian studies 
prefer to focus either mainly on class (Macdonald, 1995; Parkin, 1979) or on Stand (for 
example Collins, 1990a), drawing on Weber’s original discussion of the concepts of 
Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft and their relation to Stand and class permit a closer 
observation of the tensions between, and interrelatedness of, these concepts, their role in the 
dynamics of closure, and their relation to other societal factors, such as the changing nature 
of credentials.  
The paper’s focus is on the time period from the VDB’s formation in 1896 to events 
preceding World War I, when it effectively delegated control over professional closure to a 
semi-public bureaucratic authority, and when most of its activities ceased for the duration of 
World War I. Earlier and later events provide occasional reference points when they serve to 
illuminate the association’s strategies or their consequences. The paper draws on sources 
mainly from the time period under investigation. Where relevant, and where these inform on 
the early history of the VDB, later sources are also consulted. Sources include inter alia 
presentations made and resolutions agreed at the association’s annual meetings, articles 
published in its journal, publications by the Handelskammern and the association’s own 
publication issued to celebrate its 60th anniversary (Gerhard, 1956). Many of the 
contemporary sources used were written by members or supporters of the VDB; other authors 
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were associated with its main competitor, the (mainly bank-controlled) corporate audit firms. 
Thus a balance is aimed at between partisan and critical contemporary sources. The primary 
sources were accessed in a number of German archives and libraries, primarily the libraries 
of the universities of Cologne and Münster, the Wirtschaftsarchiv of the University of 
Cologne, the archive of the Handelshochschule Leipzig and the Bundesarchiv (Federal 
Archive) in Berlin. McClelland (1991, p. 9) comments on the scarcity of surviving records of 
regional and local professional associations in Germany; national professional journals and 
other publications however provide useful (and virtually the only surviving) material. Some 
of the more recent secondary sources (e.g. Meisel, 1992) rely heavily on a limited range of 
contemporary literature; some also contain factual errors. Most secondary sources also say 
little about the early years of the VDB. This suggests that an examination of the association’s 
own publications and other original sources are likely to provide a deeper insight.  
Below, an outline of the historical context and of the main theoretical assumptions on 
which this paper builds will first be introduced: in the next section I provide a brief overview 
of German professions and social stratification in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, and an outline of the key concepts in Weber’s theories of closure and of social 
stratification, and in Parkin’s (1979) theory of dual closure. This is followed by the paper’s 
main section, where I integrate theoretical reflections with the empirics of the case narrative, 
that is, the pursuit of status and closure in the early history of the VDB. This main section is 
divided into several subsections, which are organized around theoretical themes and 
chronological developments. The final section consists of a brief discussion and concluding 
comments. 
 
Historical and Theoretical Contexts 
 
Professions and the State   
 
Germany, as a unified nation state, emerged in the nineteenth century. A loose confederation 
of 39 principalities was created after the Napoleonic wars. After the Franco-German war of 
1870–1871, 25 principalities united as the German Empire. The separate states had only 
limited forms of democracy. Rulers had near-absolute authority and were aided by an 
authoritarian civil service, ‘a key factor in the state development of the professions’ (Neal & 
Morgan, 2000, p. 21). In this context, occupations, trades and communities representing a 
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variety of leisure, business and political interests, created voluntary associations to pursue 
their collective interests (Neal & Morgan, 2000) but had limited organizational possibilities 
(Jarausch, 1990; Neal & Morgan, 2000). In addition to voluntary associations, the established 
status professions (cf. Elliott, 1972), i.e., medicine and law, created Kammern (literally: 
chambers) – public bodies run by practitioners but closely cooperating with government 
bureaucracies (Jarausch, 1990; Kocka, 1990; McClelland, 1991, pp. 77–78). These 
represented a compromise between self-regulation and state control (Neal & Morgan, 2000), 
and their membership correlated strongly with that of the voluntary associations (McClelland, 
1991, pp. 77–78). The state regulated the market for services, jurisdictional disputes were 
settled by means of legislation, and ‘the state became the central focus of much professional 
lobbying’ (Jarausch, 1990, p. 13). This ‘leads Siegrist (1990: 46) and many others to talk of 
“professionalisation from above”’ (Macdonald, 1995, p. 91). Strong (national) professional 
associations in the English sense, thriving in a laissez-faire and free-trade environment, could 
not develop. In fact, there is no equivalent term in German for ‘profession’, the closest 
perhaps being freie Berufe or akademische Berufe; however, both overlap only partly with 
the English term.4 
Two other, interrelated features of German society pertain to the development of 
professions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: the middle classes, and the 
importance placed on academic credentials. To contextualize these and other dimensions of 
German society, I turn to Weber’s theories of stratification and of closure, which were 
developed based largely on observations of this German society, contemporaneous with the 
early years of the VBD.  
 
Weber’s Theory of Stratification: Classes, Stände and Parties 
 
Weber’s model of social stratification describes classes, Stände (‘status groups’5 – the 
singular is Stand) and parties (Weber, 1972, pp. 531–540). Classes are stratified based on 
economic circumstances and relations. Weber distinguishes between propertied classes, 
commercial classes (based on marketability of goods and services) and social classes.6 By 
contrast with class situation, position within a Stand is based on social relations. It is reflected 
in conventions and traditions; it relates to honour and social esteem, to lifestyle, education, 
and to prestige derived from ancestry or occupation (Weber, 1972, pp. 179–180, 534–535). 
Unlike classes, Stände do not result from market-based relationships, or one’s position within 
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the marketplace (Waters & Waters, 2010). Weber suggests that a Berufsstand (‘occupational 
interest group’) is also a Stand because it can only successfully lay claim to social esteem or 
honour on the strength of a specific lifestyle, which may derive from the occupation (Weber, 
1972, p. 538). Related to the concepts of classes and Stände are 
Gemeinschaft/Vergemeinschaftung and Gesellschaft/Vergesellschaftung. Gemeinschaft has 
been translated as ‘group’, ‘community’ and ‘political community’ and Gesellschaft as 
‘society’ or ‘societal’.7 Vergemeinschaftung and Vergesellschaftung are the processes of 
becoming, respectively, a Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. The concepts will be explored 
further below; for now it should be noted that Gesellschaft relationships ‘tend to be utilitarian 
and emerge from the mode of market exchange’ (Waters & Waters, 2010, p. 154; based on 
Weber, 1972, pp. 21–22), while Gemeinschaft relationships imply social interaction based 
predominantly on emotional, affectual and traditional ties (Weber, 1972, p. 21). Normally 
Stände (but not classes) are Gemeinschaften.  
Classes and Stände may both ‘engage in the collective pursuit of their interests and 
thereby enter into the third dimension of stratification, the political order’ (Macdonald, 1995, 
p. 43). This third dimension is parties. While classes are ‘at home’ in the economic order and 
Stände in the social order, parties belong to the sphere of power. Their actions are functional, 
rational and goal-oriented, and always involve Vergesellschaftung (Weber, 1972, pp. 539). 
Their aim is to influence social action and to obtain ideal or material advantages (including 
power) for their leadership and membership. They are not necessarily political parties but 
may appear as, or within, associations of any form and may be based on, or represent, the 
interests of classes or Stände (Weber, 1972, p. 167). They may apply a wide variety of means 
to obtain power, including violence or political lobbying (p. 539).  
Weber’s three dimensions of stratification are interdependent and interlinked. Each 
represents ‘a distinct aspect of power in so far as each constitutes a different basis for staking 
claims to material and symbolic rewards’ (Parkin, 2002, p. 90), although classes and Stände 
may act in similar ways when pursuing such claims (Parkin, 2002, p. 97) – both may, for 
example, pursue closure (see below). Further, social and economic characteristics and 
resources may interact: the social honour associated with Stand may (but need not) be 
associated with an individual’s class situation and economic resources (Weber, 1972, p. 533–
534; see also Harrits, 2014; Parkin, 2002, pp. 96-97). Classes, Stände and parties are thus 
phenomena of power in communities, albeit not necessarily the only ones (Parkin 2002, 
chapter 4). What is striking, though, according to Parkin, is what Weber leaves out: ‘Among 
possible candidates for inclusion in the catalogue of power, the state and bureaucracy stand 
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out as distinguished absentees’ (Parkin, 2002, p. 90). This appears especially surprising when 
one considers the prominent role of the state in German society in general and, in particular, 
vis-à-vis professional organization. This question will be explored further in our examination 
of the history of the VDB below. 
Another important feature of Weber’s stratification, in relation to the contemporary 
context, is that he assumes greater heterogeneity between strata than the Marxist dichotomy 
between capital and labour, and also conceptualizes middle classes (Macdonald, 1995, 
chapter 2). Middle classes include those that derive their living from specific skills and 
credentials; this also refers to members of the freien Berufe (see above). However, members 
of the high status professions (law and medicine) are conceptualized at the higher end of this 
stratum, since they are also included among the positively privileged classes. On the other 
hand, Weber also envisages, as a social class, a lower middle class (see note 6), which ranks 
above the working classes, but below the propertyless intelligentsia, highly trained subject 
specialists, the propertied classes and those privileged through education (Weber, 1972, pp. 
178-179). Thus stratification (and class formation) is affected by property but also by other 
criteria, and, as noted by Macdonald (1995, chapter 2), access to cultural assets contributes to 
the persistence and, in terms of professionalization, relative success of the middle classes. 
The distinction between two levels of middle class, and the significance in this of cultural 
capital, are of particular relevance to professionalization, since ‘the professional project is 
above all aimed at achieving social closure in the realm of knowledge, credentialed skills and 
respectability’ (Macdonald, 1995, p. 58). Such knowledge credentials, and in particular 
academic titles, played a much greater role in Germany at the time under investigation than 
was the case in the UK or the US (Macdonald, 1995, p. 90). However, at the time under 
investigation, the focus shifted from Bildung – wider education and learning, the cultivation 
of tastes and the development of judgement (Abbott, 1988, p. 197) – to narrower technical, 
subject specific content and titles.  
 
Closure and Dual Closure 
 
Both classes and Stände pursue collective interests. How both ‘seek to mobilize power in a 
similar way … is revealed most closely in Weber’s discussion of social closure’ (Parkin, 
2002, p. 100). Weber considers a social relationship as closed where some individuals are 
excluded from or limited in their participation. Closure can relate to, for example, family and 
	 11	
other personal relationships or relationships based on shared values; or it can be rational, 
goal-oriented (Weber, 1972, pp. 23–25) and, in economic relationships, motivated by a desire 
to monopolize social and economic opportunities by excluding outsiders (Weber, 1972, p. 
202). Weber notes that such group action (i.e., seeking closure) can lead to corresponding 
collective reaction by those excluded (p. 201). This suggestion is developed by Parkin 
(1979), who argues that: 
 
[c]losure strategies … include not only those of the exclusionary kind, but 
also those adopted by the excluded themselves as a direct response to their 
status as outsiders. … In other words, collective efforts to resist a pattern of 
dominance governed by exclusion principles can properly be regarded as the 
other half of the social closure equation. (Parkin, 1979, pp. 44–45) 
 
Parkin thus develops the concept of dual closure, where ‘exclusionary closure represents the 
use of power in a “downward” direction’, with the aim of excluding those perceived as 
inferior, while ‘usurpation’ refers to ‘the use of power in an upward direction’ (Parkin, 1979, 
p. 45), and is a collective reaction to exclusion, by those negatively privileged. Its aim is to 
gain a greater share of the resources of the positively privileged, dominant groups (Parkin, 
1979, pp. 45, 74). Further, dual closure is especially common among the lower status or 
semi-professions, ‘occupations that make claims to rewards on the basis of formal 
qualifications, but which have been unable to secure full professional closure by establishing 
a legal monopoly or control over the number and quality of entrants’ (Parkin, 1979, p. 102). 
While Parkin explores this mainly within a later setting, and with respect to teaching, nursing 
and social work, the concept of dual closure is also helpful in exploring nascent professions, 
including accounting (see for example Coronella et al., 2015; O’Regan, 2013).   
Therefore, as noted in the introduction, the early history of the VDB provides an 
opportunity to explore an incomplete professional project by applying both Weber’s original 
theories on stratification and closure, as well as Parkin’s later refinements, in a setting that 
has, to the best of my knowledge, not previously been examined through the lens of these 
theories. With regard to Weber, this also provides an opportunity to relate the concept of the 
professional project ‘to the social stratification of the society in which the project is pursued’ 
(Macdonald, 1995, p. 63).  
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Early History of the Verband Deutscher Bücherrevisoren: Vergesellschaftung, 
Vergemeinschaftung and the Pursuit of Status and Closure 
 
One type of economic determinant which frequently occurs with all forms of 
Gemeinschaft results from competition for economic opportunities … When 
the number of competitors increases in relation to the earnings margins, the 
desire of those participating in competition to somehow restrict this, also 
increases. (Weber, 1972, p. 201, my translation) 
 
Competition and the Birth of an Association 
 
At the end of the nineteenth century, German Aktiengesellschaften (‘public companies’) were 
subject to codified governance rules (Meisel, 1992, p. 63; Quick, 1990). These required a 
two-tier board structure, with a supervisory board monitoring the activities of the executive 
management board. Following a major economic and corporate crisis in the 1870s, new 
legislation in 1884 extended the duties of the supervisory board and introduced the right for 
the annual meeting or, in some circumstances, a minority of shareholders, to call for an 
external audit. A compulsory audit of the company formation process was also introduced 
(Quick, 2005; Schröer, 1993), although this only had to be carried out by external parties 
under very specific circumstances (Karoli, 1934). A biennial external audit was, however, 
introduced for cooperatives in 1889 (Quick, 2005; Schröer, 1993). Apart from these limited 
circumstances, an external audit remained voluntary, and it was rare for the annual meeting 
or the supervisory board to rely on external (professional) auditors, because doing so could be 
perceived as signalling financial difficulties (Gietzmann & Quick, 1998), and was, in any 
case, considered to be of limited benefit (Quick, 1990).  
An external audit could be provided by Bücherrevisoren and by 
Treuhandgesellschaften (‘trust companies’). The former had their origins in internal audit 
work (which was first documented, from the end of the fifteenth century, in large banking 
and trading houses) and, from the sixteenth century, in independent witness testimonies in 
court cases. These testimonies were provided under oath by Bücherrevisoren: experts – 
typically bookkeepers – who were vereidigt or beeidigt (licensed; literally: ‘sworn’ or ‘sworn 
in’) by courts to review and provide opinions on financial information (Meisel, 1992, pp. 39–
46). The first self-employed bookkeepers were itinerant Rechenmeister (‘reckoning masters’), 
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and made their living primarily by teaching and writing treatises on bookkeeping or, in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, by offering their services to merchants who did not 
employ in-house bookkeepers. Additional roles existed in bankruptcy work (Meisel, 1992, p. 
47).  
Initially, Bücherrevisoren were licensed by courts on an ad hoc basis when required 
(Markus, 1997). Only in the mid-nineteenth century did the principles underlying this process 
become somewhat consistent, and Bücherrevisoren were licensed on a permanent basis 
(Penndorf, 1932). The Hanseatic cities of Lübeck (1887), Hamburg (1888) and Bremen 
(1889) first created legislation to arrange for the licensing through Handelskammern 
(Markus, 1997; Penndorf, 1932). Handelskammern (literally: ‘chambers of commerce’) 
represented (and still represent) the interests of commerce and industry and were organized 
on a regional basis, as bodies corporate in public law. Their function was to liaise between 
trade and (regional) government and to support local authorities by issuing certificates and 
expert opinions. In some cases they were also charged with supervising public institutions 
such as stock exchanges. In the 1890s, more than 200 Handelskammern existed in the 
German states, differing in constitution and administration (Meyer, 1895).  
By 1895 approximately 140 Bücherrevisoren had been licensed by courts, and 
another 20 by the Handelskammern of the Hanseatic cities (Gerhard, 1956; Markus, 1997; 
Meisel, 1992, p. 91; Penndorf, 1932). However, like the English ‘accountant’, the designation 
Bücherrevisor itself was not licensed or protected, and was used by many individuals who 
competed for other work or jurisdictions with the vereidigten (licensed) Bücherrevisoren. 
Thus Bücherrevisoren constituted an eclectic mix, with a diversity of tasks and sometimes 
dubious qualifications. Key activities were bookkeeping and accounting, and business 
education. Actual Revision (that is, mainly voluntary audit work) was only of limited 
practical and economic significance for the majority of Bücherrevisoren, whether licensed or 
not (Gerhard, 1956, p. 8; Römer, 1905). It was, however, prestigious, was seen as their core 
activity, and became a major focus of the VDB’s Berufstandspolitik – the ‘organised pursuit 
of collective interests’ (Jarausch, 1990; Schreier, 1925).  
The only tasks for which vereidigte Bücherrevisor held a legal monopoly related to 
work arising from their official court or Handelskammer appointments, typically involving 
forensic audit work and expert witness testimonies. The primary significance of these was not 
in direct financial gain, but rather in that their licence signified formal credentials, and those 
thus qualified gained a competitive advantage over those not licensed, by being generally 
favoured also in other appointments (Gerhard, 1956, p. 8; Römer, 1905). In addition, given 
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the traditional German respect for public office (Macdonald, 1995), such appointments 
carried social credit and status honour (cf. Collins, 1990a).  
In the 1890s, corporate collapses revived periodic debates about the need for a wider 
statutory audit requirement. Perhaps anticipating legislative changes (see below), a number of 
Handelskammern began to develop regulations for the licensing of Bücherrevisoren 
(Gerhard, 1956). These developments suggested a potential increase in the number as well as 
the influence of vereidigte Bücherrevisoren, and the impact of the ideological and marketing 
advantages of licensed status on their non-court jurisdictions – in particular voluntary audit 
mandates – was perceived as a threat by Bücherrevisoren who did not have this formal 
endorsement.  
Weber argues that, as the number of competitors in relation to income-generating 
opportunities grows, those involved in competition will wish to restrict this competition. An 
interest group – perhaps in the form of an association – emerges and acts collectively to 
exclude outsiders (i.e., competitors). As noted above, this can be motivated by the desire to 
monopolize and close social and (in particular) economic opportunities against outsiders 
(Weber, 1972, pp. 23–25, 201–202). This provides a simple and compelling explanation for 
the formation of the first association of German auditors.  
This occurred in November 1896, when fifteen Bücherrevisoren founded the Verband 
Berliner Bücherrevisoren. A month later, an open letter was sent to colleagues in Berlin, 
outlining the new association’s objectives: to unite those Bücherrevisoren who were not 
licensed and break the monopoly of the vereidigten Bücherrevisoren (Gerhard, 1956; 
Schreier, 1925). The association intended to be selective, admitting only Bücherrevisoren 
considered suitable on a technical and personal level, and membership was therefore 
expected to raise the status of this group (Penndorf, 1932).  
The motive of breaking the vereidigte Bücherrevisoren’s monopoly8 benefits from 
further examination with reference to Parkin’s (1979) concept of dual closure. As Parkin’s 
model would suggest, the formation of the Verband Berliner Bücherrevisoren reflects a 
collective reaction by members of a group that felt its economic opportunities becoming 
restricted and was negatively privileged vis-à-vis their ‘legally defined superiors’ (Parkin, 
1979, p. 45), the vereidigten Bücherrevisoren. It also reflects an attempt to usurp the 
privileges, or to bite ‘into the resources and benefits’ (Parkin, 1979, p. 74) of this dominant 
group. What is unusual about the German case is the fact that it was a subordinate group that 
took (pre-emptive) action, when the better qualified vereidigten Bücherrevisoren had not yet 
organized. The creation of a collective interest group was, in this case, initiated first by the 
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negatively privileged. This may appear intuitively contrary to the expectation, based on 
Weber and Parkin, that it should have been a reaction to (prior) organization and exclusionary 
strategies implemented by the dominant, privileged group. In any case, this particular 
German experience suggests that an attempt to use power in an upward direction can also 
exist without explicit organization or action by the legally privileged.  
In addition, the Verband Berliner Bücherrevisoren now also began to pursue 
exclusionary closure, by being selective in its membership. Further endeavours relating to 
exclusionary closure will be explored below; first, though, the association’s organizational 
activities will be examined. 
 
Policy U-turn: the Positively Privileged Take over the Negatively Privileged 
 
Given the above developments, it may be expected that the formation of the Verband 
Berliner Bücherrevisoren should have been perceived as a threat (or simply an inspiration) to 
the vereidigte Bücherrevisoren, at least on a local level, and would have led to the formation 
of a rival association. However, this was not what occurred next.  
In 1900, a new commercial code, the Handelsgesetzbuch of 1897, came into force. 
This contained some limited provisions regarding the appointment, remuneration and powers 
of those employed in the audit of the company formation process (Schröer, 1993; 
Sponheimer, 1925, p. 23). More importantly, in 1897 Prussian law, and in 1900 a German-
wide amended Gewerbeordnung (Trade Regulations Act), extended the right to license 
Bücherrevisoren to authorities other than courts – primarily the Handelskammern (Meisel, 
1992, pp. 94–95; Schreier, 1925, p. 221). This was intended to redress a perceived shortage 
of sufficiently competent and independent Bücherrevisoren, inter alia for the external audits 
of company foundation processes and of cooperatives (Klausing, 1933). While the law did 
not require external auditors to be vereidigte Bücherrevisoren, the Gewerbeordnung 
effectively codified their elite status9 (see also Gerhard, 1956 p. 9). However, the only 
jurisdiction over which they held an actual monopoly continued to be Handelskammer 
appointments. The Bücherrevisor title itself remained unprotected.  
Another significant development occurred in 1902, when a new competitor, the 
corporate Deutsche Treuhand Gesellschaft, entered the (voluntary) audit market.10 It had 
been founded in 1890, initially as a finance and trust company for the protection of 
shareholders’ foreign investments (Meisel, 1992). From 1902, it included audit work in its 
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service portfolio (Anonymous, 1914). In 1903 it carried out 27 external audits, and by 1907 
approximately 400 (Quick, 2005, with reference to Lansburgh, 1908).	 Its success triggered 
the foundation of other corporate Treuhandgesellschaften. The majority of these were 
founded by banks and retained close links with their parent companies (Hintner, 1926, p. 60). 
At around the same time, events abroad, and in particular the introduction of the statutory 
audit requirement in the UK’s Companies Act (1900), were observed with interest (Römer, 
1905).  
The membership of the young Verband Berliner Bücherrevisoren now faced even 
greater competition, and responded by changing its strategies. In 1898, it changed its name to 
Verband Deutscher Bücherrevisoren (VDB), thereby signalling its intention of geographical 
expansion (Gerhard, 1956, p. 8). Most significantly, in a complete reversal of its initial 
objectives, in 1902 it abandoned the policy to oppose vereidigte Bücherrevisoren. Instead, it 
now aimed specifically to represent this group. In fact, by 1902 the majority of VDB 
members were licensed (see Schreier, 1925, p. 238; and Table 1). This proportion had 
increased to nearly 80 percent by 1905.11 Therefore, rather than creating a rival association, 
members of a positively privileged group (in terms of credentials, status and market 
advantage) simply took over an association created by a negatively privileged group, and 
shaped it to suit its own purposes. This also meant that the VDB had now closely aligned 
itself to the Handelskammern, but with the expectation of remaining autonomous.  
 
[please insert Table 1 approximately here] 
 
Contributing to this policy U-turn were two key individuals, Ernst Römer and Arthur Rettig, 
both vereidigte Bücherrevisoren, who joined the VDB in 1902 and had a significant influence 
on its development. The question arises as to why these and other individuals within the 
growing number of vereidigte Bücherrevisoren now felt the need to organize, when this had 
not been the case earlier. One explanation may be that they had previously felt sufficiently 
secure with the legal protection of their Handelskammer mandates. Another likely factor was 
that they were geographically dispersed throughout the politically fragmented Germany, and 
not interacting beyond the confines of the local authorities that had appointed them. The 
VDB, with its new ambition to expand across Germany, had now created an opportunity and 
infrastructure for national organization. In addition, the legislative developments described 
above led to an increase in the number of vereidigte Bücherrevisoren, and thereby, in theory, 
to the potential to develop the critical mass necessary for effective organization – although 
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initially only a minority of those eligible joined. Further, competition also increased. 
Competitors were in particular the large corporate Treuhandgesellschaften, but also other 
(unlicensed), sometimes ‘disreputable’ Bücherrevisoren with dubious qualifications. Finally, 
the young Scottish and English professional associations and the new UK audit legislation 
had created models and benchmarks to aspire to, which were frequently referred to in the 
VDB’s propaganda. 
 
Gesellschaft, Gemeinschaft and the Development of a Berufsstand  
 
Under the leadership of Römer and Rettig, the association became considerably more active 
(Gerhard, 1956, p. 9). Its objectives, as referred to in its Articles of Association, in public 
presentations, publications and in its internal discourse, now focused primarily on 
organization, and specifically centred around two themes. The first of these was ‘Protection 
of the Standesinteressen [approximately: status group interests] of the Bücherrevisoren’ (my 
translation). The second theme concerned securing and protecting markets and income (§2, 
Articles of Association, 1905, in Anonymous, 1906, p. 137).  
The VDB’s early initiatives included the foundation of a journal (from 1903) and of 
annual congresses (from 1905), and the stipulation of entry requirements (see below). Within 
the first decade of the century the VDB had refined its Articles of Association and begun to 
develop and implement professional principles, fee scales, audit guidelines, ethical rules, an 
Ehrengericht (a disciplinary tribunal; literally: court of honour) and insurance and charitable 
institutions (Anonymous, 1909a; Beigel, 1914; Berliner, 1921; Gerhard, 1956; Verband 
Deutscher Bücherrevisoren, 1912a). The VDB also engaged in large-scale advertising on 
behalf of the association and its members (e.g., Anonymous, 1906). A number of new 
branches (Leipzig in 1903, Cologne, Essen and Frankfurt a.M. in 1909) were also created 
(Anonymous, 1909b).  
In essence, the VDB developed attributes and strategies that would be typical for 
older successful professions – law and medicine in Germany and British accountancy.12 The 
development of these ‘“signals of movement” towards occupational ascendancy’ (see 
Carnegie & Edwards, 2001, p. 301) can serve not only, or not primarily, the pursuit of market 
interests, but also that of high occupational status honour (cf. Collins, 1990a). In Weber’s 
terms, they can contribute to signalling the evolution from primarily economic relations 
(associated with class and Gesellschaft) into a collective also involving social relations – in 
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other words, a (Berufs)Stand.  
Parkin argues that Weber ‘sees status groups [i.e., Stände] as fairly combatitive 
bodies’ and ‘as collectives that mobilize their members for competitive struggles of all kinds, 
material and symbolic. That is, they act in a manner not too dissimilar from that of social 
classes or the organizations based on social classes’ (Parkin, 2002, p. 97). They may even be 
more effective in engaging in distributive struggle than social classes, because social classes 
are too heterogeneous to be effective as social actors, while ‘[s]tatus groups … are more 
likely to have a powerful sense of their own common identity and of the social boundary 
separating them from others … As a consequence they can be more readily mobilized for 
collective ends’ (Parkin, 2002, pp. 97–98). Professional organization involves developing 
such common identity, or group consciousness (Walker, 1995, 2004). Drawing on Weber’s 
writings on classes and Stände provides insights into how the VDB developed this sense of 
identity. It also sheds light on the tension between the VDB’s pursuit of status honour (or 
ständische Ehre) and market interests, and the relevance of both Stand and class 
consciousness to their activities.  
For Weber, Stände (unlike classes) tend to be Gemeinschaften, albeit of an amorphous 
nature (Weber, 1972, p. 534). They are social groups where emotional, affectual and 
traditional ties take precedence over utilitarian or economic interests. This is the case for 
family ties, national or religious groups, and fraternities, but, as noted above, also applies to 
Berufsstände (Weber, 1972, p. 538). In most social relationships, Vergemeinschaftung and 
Vergesellschaftung (i.e., the development of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft) coexist, albeit in 
‘an uneasy tension’ (Waters & Waters, 2010). Associations may be formed for a rational, 
utilitarian objective, but where interaction within a group (Gesellschaft) develops into 
personal social interaction beyond the purely commercial (encompassing shared values, tastes 
and lifestyles), this signifies Vergemeinschaftung (Weber, 1972, pp. 205) – a step towards the 
evolution of a Stand. Many of the VDB’s activities reflect such aspirations: entry 
requirements, the journal and the annual congresses raised members’ real and perceived 
credentials and contributed to the solidification of group identity of the now geographically 
more dispersed membership. The journal and the congresses also acted as vehicles for the 
development and dissemination of education and professional politics. Specific initiatives, 
such as fee scales and collective advertising, may also have reduced the need for individual 
negotiation in the marketplace, and thus distanced the individual member from some of the 
stigma associated (for stratification based on Stand) with purely commercial pursuits. 
Professional rules, disciplinary measures and the Ehrengericht all emphasized occupational 
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honour and the aspiration to be recognized as a (Berufs-)Stand, as did the terminology 
employed in the VDB’s discourses, which frequently used the term Stand on its own or in 
compounds, such as Berufsstand or Standesinteressen (see above). 
Further, as noted above, nascent occupations frequently mimic formal characteristics 
of older professions (Ramirez, 2001). In parallel, the evolution of a Stand frequently involves 
emulation of other lifestyles, and thereby laying claim to, or, in Weber’s terms, usurping, 
ständische Ehre (status honour) and adopting characteristics or conventions associated with 
this. (In fact, according to Weber, virtually all stratification based on Stand is initially based 
on usurpation.) Related to this, the lifestyle associated with this status honour involves 
restricting one’s social interaction to the ‘right’ circles (Weber, 1972, p. 535). 
This was reflected in the VDB’s social activities, in particular those taking place 
under the umbrella of the association days. The association days were reported in great detail 
in the VDB’s journal (for example, Der Vorstand, 1905, pp. 108-12; Anonymous, 1907a). 
Apart from lectures, presentations and internal politics, they were dominated by social 
interaction and cultural events: informal, social get-togethers in the evenings, extensive 
lunches and formal dinners to which also the accompanying ladies were invited, musical 
entertainment and sightseeing tours in coaches drawn by teams of four horses. Guests of 
honour represented the local Handelskammer, local authorities, the merchant elite, and 
banking institutes, and included also judges, lawyers and other members of the legal 
establishment. In addition, the press was invited. All this reflects Vergemeinschaftung, as 
well as attempts to lay claim to ständische Ehre. It signalled a specific, cultured lifestyle, and 
facilitated interaction with the ‘right’ circles. Other indications that the VDB leadership were 
attempting lay claim to occupational status honour akin to that of the high status professions 
were reflected in their rhetoric: references to Standesehre and Berufsehre (status and 
occupational honour), and the use of designations that included the term Anwalt (‘lawyer’). 
Römer (1905), for example, argues that ‘it should … be the case that the Bücherrevisor, who 
is basically really a lawyer, that is, an accounting lawyer [Rechnungsanwalt], should also … 
occupy a social position similar to that of the German lawyer’ (p. 261, my translation, see 
also Evans, 2005). Thus the use of designations usually reserved for the legal profession, but 
also of the venerated English audit profession, occurred frequently. 
 
Exclusionary Closure: Women, Employees and the ‘Disreputable’ 
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Parkin (1979, p. 102) suggests that especially the lower or semi-professions are likely to 
combine organization and usurpation with exclusionary closure. Exclusionary closure is 
based on positive or negative characteristics in competitors which can be taken as a reason 
for exclusion, and may include race, language and origin, but are, according to Weber, 
essentially arbitrary (Weber, 1972, pp. 201–202). Prior (accounting) literature has explored 
closure based on, inter alia, gender, ethnicity, or class (Hammond, Clayton & Arnold, 2009; 
Jacobs, 2003; Kirkham & Loft, 1993; Roberts & Coutts, 1992; etc.). 
Parkin critically notes that Weber does not give sufficient weight to the role of the 
state in his theory of stratification or his discussion of closure. According to Parkin, the 
suggestion that interest groups draw on the legal order to exclude outsiders, develop 
monopolies and thereby limit competition (Weber, 1972, p. 202) appears to be the only 
significant reference to the role of the state (Parkin, 2002, pp. 101–102). Parkin considers this 
a serious flaw and argues that the state is more significant than Weber acknowledges. This 
applies, in particular, to the characteristics on which closure is based. According to Parkin, 
they are not arbitrary; instead the group singled out for exclusion has already been ‘defined as 
legally inferior by the state’ – this applies for example to women (Parkin, 1979, pp. 95–96).  
Following its policy U-turn, the VDB now attempted to increase its critical mass by 
attracting, in particular, well qualified, licensed members. At the same time, it also pursued a 
strategy of exclusionary closure. According to its Articles of Association of 1905 (§3), a new 
member could be any honourable German Bücherrevisor of at least 30 years of age, who was 
independent in his occupation, had worked as a self-employed Bücherrevisor in Germany for 
at least three years and had demonstrated his qualification. This last condition was waived for 
candidates who had been permanently licensed by the appropriate authorities. Members could 
be expelled (§6b) if they no longer fulfilled the entry requirements, for non-payment of 
membership fees, for damaging the reputation or interests of the association, for not 
complying with its resolutions, for uncollegiate behaviour and for acting on behalf of 
Treuhandgesellschaften (Anonymous, 1906, p. 137). Formal disciplinary procedures, 
including the Ehrengericht, facilitated the expulsion of undesirable persons. Further, the 
VDB’s discourse and exclusionary tactics construed three types of individuals as outsiders: 
women, employees (as opposed to self-employed practitioners) and individuals considered 
disreputable.  
Gender as a focus of closure has been widely explored (for accounting, see for 
example Kirkham & Loft, 1993; Roberts & Coutts, 1992). For the VDB, the case against 
women was grounded in the historical context. In nineteenth-century German middle class 
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society, gender roles were strictly segregated. A woman’s role was limited to the private 
household sphere, and included the transmission of cultural capital to her children (Kocka, 
1995). This began to change towards the end of the century, when women became 
increasingly involved in public life, gained (limited) access to university education and 
occupations, and lobbied for political suffrage. However, women’s demands and the 
women’s movement triggered a backlash, with the foundation of antifeminist organizations 
such as the Deutsche Bund zur Bekämpfung der Frauenemanzipation (‘German league in the 
struggle against women’s emancipation’), which aimed to preserve traditional gender roles 
and protect men from female involvement in the professions and politics (Fout, 1992; 
McClelland, 1991, p. 111; Streubel, 2006).   
Within this context, a resolution was proposed at the VDB’s first congress in 1905, 
which declared that women were not suited to audit work. It was argued that, as they did not 
take part in public affairs to the same extent as men, women lacked a wider perspective with 
respect to management and the internal connection between processes, and that without this 
perspective, auditing could not be properly practised. While women were considered suitable 
for certain tasks of a computational character, they were not qualified to summarize findings, 
prepare final reports or conduct critical examinations. The VDB membership agreed to lobby 
the Handelskammern to prevent women from being licensed as auditors (Der Vorstand, 1905, 
p. 110; Rüdiger, 1905).13 Thus, in line with developments elsewhere and in other occupations 
(Witz, 2013), auditing was discursively constructed as a male occupation. This followed the 
model of the established, higher status professions of medicine and law and supports Parkin’s 
argument above. Also, given the cultural expectations of German society, admitting women 
would have been contrary to the VDB members’ lifestyle and status aspirations, and 
perceived as detrimental to occupational upward social mobility (cf. Kirkham & Loft, 1993; 
Roberts & Coutts, 1992).  
The second group excluded from VDB membership were individuals not working 
independently in private practice. Employment status had complex interrelated implications. 
Closure against employees may simply have been making a virtue out of necessity: in 1900 
the Prussian Ministry for Commerce and Trade had prohibited the licensing of persons who 
were carrying out the occupation of Bücherrevisoren as employees (i.e., not self-employed) 
(Gerhard, 1956, p. 12), and this was also consistently reflected in the Handelskammer 
regulations. The question was revisited in 1908, when a commission of the Association of 
Middle-German Handelskammern considered whether Bücherrevisoren should be permitted 
to employ assistants to support their work (Pfahl, 1911). This was dismissed as not worthy of 
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discussion: ‘The office of the Bücherrevisor has to be a personal one. How can he bear the 
responsibility or give the guarantee that one of his assistants has not made a mistake or was 
too lazy, to audit the thing properly …’ (Pfahl, 1911, p. 598, citing a representative of the 
Handelskammer in Magdeburg, my translation). Thus, in spite of the changing audit market, 
the Handelskammern insisted that the occupation was carried out ‘frei und selbständig’ (‘free 
and self-employed’; Gerhard, 1956, p. 12). Since the VDB now aimed to recruit in particular 
licensed Bücherrevisoren as new members, it also retained the requirement for members to 
be self-employed.14 This also supports Parkin’s argument that characteristics selected as the 
basis of exclusion tend to be already enshrined in the legal order. 
The stance against employees also had deeper socio-political exclusionary 
connotations. These reflect the closeness between Weber’s concepts of social class and Stand 
(Weber, 1972, p. 180, see note 6) and the similarity of exclusionary motives and actions 
between classes and Stände as observed by Parkin (2002). In particular, the requirement to be 
self-employed also excluded Treuhandgesellschaften employees from VDB membership, and 
constituted part of the discourse against this competitor.15  
As noted above, Stand is inextricably linked with honour, rather than with market 
considerations (Weber, 1972, pp. 179–180). Stratification based on Stand constrains the 
development of a free market. Members of a Berufsstand derive social status from the 
occupation and the lifestyle it engenders (Weber, 1972, pp. 531–540). This applies in 
particular to the traditional high status professions with their functionalist public interest 
claims. It does not apply to occupations associated primarily with economic and market 
interests, since the market is dominated by rational considerations, is not interested in 
personal reputations, and ‘knows nothing of “honour”’ (Weber, 1972, p. 538, my translation). 
According to Weber, the entire social order (as based on Stand) would be threatened if purely 
economic acquisition and power could confer honour, or even greater status honour than that 
which could be gained on the basis of Stand and lifestyle. For this reason, those benefiting 
from a social order based on Stand are likely to react strongly against pretensions based 
primarily on economic acquisition (Weber, 1972, p. 538; see also Parkin, 2002, pp. 96–97).  
Therefore, although their jurisdictions and market interests largely overlapped with 
those of the Treuhandgesellschaften, and although the Bücherrevisoren occupation was 
defined as a trade by inclusion in the Gewerbeordnung, the VDB emphatically differentiated 
itself from its corporate competitors. In its rhetoric and politics it sharply attacked the 
primarily utilitarian, commercial Treuhandgesellschaften (and their employees) as 
representatives of cold capitalist and market interests. They were portrayed as true 
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Gesellschaften, in Weber’s sense; not associated with shared values, tastes, lifestyles and 
personal honour, nor with the concept of Stand. This was contrasted with the VDB’s own 
proclaimed social standing as Berufsstand and the associated occupational status honour. 
This is, for example, emphasized by Römer (1905), when he repeatedly draws parallels 
between the English profession and the VDB’s aspirations, and contrasts both with the 
Treuhandgesellschaften: 
 
[T]he distinguished rank of the English accountants is not actually primarily 
based upon [the fact that they are backed by] guarantee capital, but much 
more on their comprehensive subject knowledge, their upright sense of honour 
and status [Stand] and their strictly maintained independence… (Römer, 1905, 
p. 274, my translation) 
 
While an ideology relating to stratification based on Stand was prominent in the VDB’s 
discourse, its motivation and exclusionary activities against employees also make sense if 
conceptualized on the basis of class stratification. As noted by Kocka (1995, p. 784), artisans, 
tradesmen and merchants had been part of the middle class, but towards the end of the 
nineteenth century were increasingly considered as lower middle class, that is, not ‘the 
middle class proper’. Preceding World War I, they were united by a common ideology in 
which they were supported by their respective chambers of commerce and trade (Kocka, 
1973). On the one hand they demanded state protection against competitive capitalism, 
unrestricted free enterprise competition, industrialization and big business ‘with its advantage 
of large scale organisation’; on the other hand this ideology also contributed to a widening 
gap in the class consciousness between employer and employee (Kocka, 1973, p. 104). This 
may have contributed to the idealization of self-employed status, both for the 
Handelskammern, whose members were of, or aspired to, middle class (proper) status and 
represented the Bücherrevisoren’s clients for a variety of tasks, and for the VDB itself. 
Insisting on self-employed independence effectively closed the association to employees of 
the Treuhandgesellschaften, who may have been seen as simultaneously representing labour 
and the threat of organized capital.  
In essence, then, the VDB’s discourse associated ideals of professional independence 
and the personal responsibility of the individual with the organizational form of the sole 
practitioner, but not with corporate audit firms (Römer, 1905; see also Evans, 2003).16  
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Motives for closure typically relate to a shortage of opportunities for consumption or 
economic (income-generating) opportunities (Weber, 1972, pp. 24–-25), but can also include 
a desire to maintain quality (which can, in turn, translate into increased prestige and thereby 
into improved economic and social prospects). These interrelated motives support closure 
attempts also specifically directed at competitors who are constructed as socially or 
technically inferior (cf. Walker, 2004). A third target of the VDB’s discourse and 
exclusionary tactics was therefore individuals considered disreputable, or poorly qualified. 
As noted above, the designation Bücherrevisor was not legally protected and the occupation 
was open to anybody, regardless of character and qualification. As the market for accounting 
and audit services grew, it increasingly attracted individuals who had been unsuccessful in 
other careers (VDB, 1912a). Bücherrevisoren, especially if not licensed, faced threats to their 
market as well as to their reputation and status. In early twentieth-century Germany, much of 
the contemporary literature critically notes this problem.17 Sponheimer (1925) suggests that 
‘the occupation became to a large extent the safe haven of failed existences’ (p.16, my 
translation); its number ‘generally rises and falls in parallel to the increase in unemployment 
of small commercial employees’ (p. 8, my translation). Many entrants did not survive for 
long in the occupation: basic statistics for the period 1903–1928 suggest that in the Leipzig 
area, more than a third of all Bücherrevisoren abandoned this career after, at most, three 
years (Schulze, 1928).  
The VDB addressed these concerns partly through its own membership rules and 
entry requirements, and through the construction of group identity and the development of 
community, as a Stand. In addition, external promotions and public relations work also 
featured heavily among the VDB’s strategies (Anonymous, 1906). This constructed the VDB 
member as self-employed, independent and with years of practical experience. It associated 
these qualities, and VDB membership, with superior social and professional standing. In 
addition, improved and coordinated Handelskammer regulations were expected to protect the 
reputation of the VDB’s licensed members (see below). However, these measures were not 
sufficient, and in 1911 the VDB attempted to engage state agencies to further its policies of 
exclusion, seeking legal protection of the title Bücherrevisor. As noted above, this was in line 
with German culture and professional politics, but also with similar development elsewhere, 
especially in continental Europe (Bocqueraz, 2001; Coronella et al., 2015; Ramirez, 2001). It 
also supports Parkin’s (1979) argument that the state plays a more significant role in 
exclusionary closure than is made explicit by Weber (see above); that, in fact, exclusionary 
closure means attempting to ‘win the backing of the state and the support of the law’ (p. 98). 
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It represents a strategy in the pursuit of legal privileges, including monopolies and protection 
in the market place, and legal sanctions against infringement of these monopolies (Parkin, 
1979, p. 98; 2002, p. 100, see also Coronella et al., 2015).  
A proposal to take measures to protect the title had already been made at the VDB’s 
annual general meeting in 1907. Following up suggestions made on that occasion, in 1911 the 
VDB submitted a memorandum to the Bundesrat (the upper house of parliament, which was 
considerably more powerful than its modern equivalent). In this memorandum, the VDB 
requested legal protection of the title Bücherrevisor – specifically ‘to include the occupation 
of the Bücherrevisoren among those types of occupations, the practising of which can be 
prohibited in cases of unreliability (§35 of the Gewerbeordnung)’ (VDB, 1912a, p. 671, my 
translation). In an initiative to discredit undesirable elements, the VDB had also gathered 
examples of malpractice, and now offered to present these to the Bundesrat (VDB, 1912a): 
 
While it occurs, on the one hand, that individuals who called themselves 
‘Bücherrevisor’, have by their activity burdened themselves with the odium of 
unreliability, but may nevertheless continue to refer to themselves as 
‘Bücherrevisor’ so, on the other hand, there are also a considerable number of 
persons who have turned to the Bücherrevisoren occupation after they have 
earlier suffered moral defect or made the acquaintance of the criminal judge. 
We are, if required, in a position to name a considerable number of such 
characters, who would in any case never attain respect and a satisfactory 
existence in the occupation they wish to be part of, but instead can only 
damage it. (VDB, 1912a, p. 672, my translation) 
 
Had the VDB’s submission been successful, this would effectively have resulted in state-
regulation (Meisel, 1992, p. 133). However, in spite of general support from the 
Handelskammern, the submission was rejected (Gerhard, 1956, p. 14). Reports, 
commissioned by the government, argued inter alia that the public, if taking reasonable care, 
should be able to protect itself against unreliable Bücherrevisoren (Hannoverscher Courier, 
1912, p. 5, reprinted in Anonymous, 1912c). Although in principle supporting the VDB’s 
case, the Handelskammer in Oldenburg provided a further argument against the desired 
change: 
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the proposed action would elevate the trade of the independent 
Bücherrevisoren to such a degree that a practical difference between the 
vereidigten Bücherrevisoren and those not licensed would barely exist, and 
that it would therefore be most appropriate to abolish the licensing of 
Bücherrevisoren. (VDB, 1912b, p. 20, my translation) 
 
In other words, at a time when VDB membership comprised only a minority of all vereidigte 
Bücherrevisoren, protection of the title would have virtually eliminated the difference 
between those who were licensed by the Handelskammern (or other authorities) and those 
who were not. Therefore, this attempt to exclude competitors who were socially or 
technically inferior also contained an element of usurpation (in Parkin’s sense), by biting into 
the privileges and the monopoly of all vereidigte Bücherrevisoren, including those who were 
not VDB members. Legal protection would also have raised the status of all Bücherrevisoren 
(not only VDB members) significantly and resulted in market advantages also for tasks not 
protected by the Handelskammern, potentially also usurping the domain of other professions, 
including law. Finally, legal protection would also have reduced the VDB’s dependence on 
the Handelskammern. That the VDB’s submission was unsuccessful supports Parkin’s (1979, 
pp. 74–75) suggestion that usurpationary activities are less likely to be supported by 
institutional and legal backing than exclusionary activities, because they are  
 
a challenge to the formal system of distributive justice expressed in the legal 
endorsement of exclusionary rules and institutions. If the fruits that should 
rightfully fall to the owners of property and credentials are plucked too freely 
by those who have neither, but who have some alternative means of access, as 
it were, then clearly the whole purpose of closure through proprietorship and 
certification is thrown into question. 
 
A Question of Credentials: Personal Qualities and Subject Experts 
 
In the early history of the VDB, the question of formal credentials played an important role in 
two instances: the introduction of a business school diploma in auditing and a debate on 
examinations as a condition for Handelskammer licensing. These developments impacted a 
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number of interrelated issues: control over credentialling, competition and closure, and, 
related to the latter, implications for Stand and class consciousness.  
Weber notes that, where individuals distinguish themselves by means of a specific 
quality acquired through breeding, training or practice, those who consider themselves so 
qualified will ‘monopolise control over the relevant ideal, social and economic assets, duties 
and positions as “Beruf”’ and restrict access to this Beruf to those who have met certain entry 
requirements’ (Weber, 1972, p. 203, my translation). The nature of these entry requirements 
has implications for social standing, and is associated with the distinction between 
Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft. Where membership of a group is dependent on meeting 
purely formal conditions, credentials or achievements, Weber associates this with 
Vergesellschaftung – utilitarian, rational and often purely commercial relationships. Where, 
on the other hand, Vergemeinschaftung takes place; that is, where interaction involves social 
relations and shared values, then prospective members’ admission is often explicitly or 
implicitly subject to evaluation and approval of the individuals’ Sein (approximately: ‘being’, 
‘essence’); that is, their personal qualities, character and personality. Having been thus 
admitted to such an exclusive group carries prestige well beyond that implied in the practical 
or technical purposes of the group. In addition, participation in the activities of this 
Gemeinschaft allows the new member to benefit from social networks and connections 
(Weber, 1972, p. 205).  
In Germany, in the mid-nineteenth century, education and academic titles had been 
very important indicators and sources of social standing, power and income (Kocka, 1978, 
1981; Macdonald, 1995, chapter 3). University education had little direct relevance to 
professional practice, but focused on Bildung, that is, wider education and culture (see 
above). The Bildungsbürgertum (the ‘educated middle classes’) enjoyed high status, power 
and prestige. Weber, too, links upbringing and Bildung with social prestige, although he 
emphasizes the importance of lifestyle over university education. Specifically, he 
distinguishes the kultivierte Mensch (‘cultivated person’) from the Fachmensch (‘subject 
expert’). Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the latter was on the rise. 
Industrialization had increased the wealth and power of industrialists and merchants, 
who now also aspired to raise their social status by means of academic credentials, and from 
the 1870s, vocational disciplines became increasingly academized (Kocka, 1978, 1981). In 
initiatives paralleled in the US, the first business schools were founded in the late 1890s 
(Lindenfeld, 1990).18 In 1907, the Handelshochschule Leipzig (Leipzig Business School) 
commenced courses for the education of Bücherrevisoren, and awarded diplomas. It thus 
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accredited Diplombücherrevisoren by means of a state-controlled examination. Other 
business schools soon began to follow with similar initiatives (Gerhard, 1956). This was a 
threat to the considerable number of Bücherrevisoren whose income depended on teaching 
(see above). In addition, this development threatened a loss of cognitive exclusiveness, a 
change in the market for credentials, and delegation of control over training and 
qualifications to civil servants and academics (cf. Macdonald, 1995, p. 94; also Collins, 
1990b).  
Not surprisingly, the VDB was initially strongly opposed to these new academic 
titles. While it had from the start engaged with the education and training of its members,19 it 
intended to control the provision of this education, frequently citing the English profession’s 
example (Beigel, 1924, pp. 17–18; Römer, 1905, pp. 6, 270).  
Now state-recognized academic credentials introduced a new hierarchy among bodies 
of knowledge in Ramirez’s (2001) terms, and when the first course was held at the 
Handelshochschule Leipzig in the winter semester 1907–08, the VDB therefore counselled 
caution, in the public interest and in the interests of the Bücherrevisoren Stand. In particular, 
it warned against credentialling auditors without sufficient practical experience20 
(Anonymous, 1907b, p. 218; Römer, 1905, p. 269). Later, in correspondence with the 
professor in charge of the programme, the attitude was openly hostile:  
 
We would be delighted to hear from you to what purpose you educate 
‘Bücherrevisoren’ at your business school and to turn these, by means of an 
examination, into Diplom- or state-examined Bücherrevisoren. These gentlemen, 
who are not even licensed, are after all by no means more competent than the 
vereidigten Bücherrevisoren, since they are lacking the required, so 
extraordinarily necessary practice. (Anonymous, 1911, p. 560, my translation)21 
 
The VDB was particularly concerned because, while the Handelskammern limited the 
number of auditors licensed in accordance with market demand, the business schools did not 
consider demand, and therefore threatened to swamp the market with academically accredited 
auditors. In this concern, the VDB and most of the Handelskammern22 were initially united: 
 
… it was to be feared that through the introduction of an examination at a 
business school the number of Bücherrevisoren would increase extraordinarily 
and that the Bücherrevisoren licensed by the Handelskammern would receive 
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severe competition through the Revisoren examined by the business schools. 
(Anonymous, 1912a, p. 753, my translation)  
 
This fear was not unreasonable. A proliferation of academic credentials also affected other 
occupations, including the high status professions, medicine and law (Abbott, 1988, p. 198; 
Neal & Morgan, 2000), and constituted an effective barrier to closure (McClelland, 1991, p. 
22). For the VDB, the business school diplomas created new competitors and were therefore 
detrimental to its own closure attempts.  
At the same time, diplomas could themselves be exploited as a basis for exclusion 
(see, for example, Coronella et al., 2015). Weber provides an example with reference to ‘the 
foundation of a “Verbande der Diplomingenieure” [association of engineering graduates], 
which attempts to enforce the legal or factual monopoly over specific positions for its 
members, against those without diplomas’ (Weber, 1972, p. 202, my translation). The 
diploma in engineering had been introduced at technical colleges eight years previous to the 
equivalent developments in auditing. The Verband Deutscher Diplomingeneure, to which 
Weber alludes, was founded in 1909 (Jarausch, 1990, p. 21). Interestingly, it not only 
attempted to exclude engineers without diplomas, but also challenged, unsuccessfully, the 
title awarded to the Diplombücherrevisoren, arguing that the course did not fulfil the 
educational requirements expected for the award of a diploma (Verband Deutscher 
Diplombücherrevisoren, 1912; see also note 24). 
Weber perceives these developments critically. He observes that Fachprüfungen 
(subject specific, specialist examinations) and Bildungspatente (literally: educational patents) 
had become a way to monopolize prominent social and economic positions. For the 
‘candidates for diplomas’, they formed a basis for creating a new elite, for social 
advancement, for admission to elevated social circles and for claims for payment befitting 
one’s Stand, rather than based on performance (Weber, 1972, p. 577). Weber notes  
 
If we hear, in all areas, demands for the introduction of regulated educational 
pathways and Fachprüfungen, then the reason for this is of course not a 
suddenly awakened ‘desire for Bildung’, but rather an effort to limit the 
supply-side for these positions and to monopolize these for the holders of 
Bildungspatente. For such monopolization, the ‘examination’ is, nowadays, the 
universal method, which explains its unstoppable advance. (Weber, 1972, p. 
577, my translation; see also Parkin, 2002, p. 101) 
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The introduction of business school diplomas in auditing is a contemporary illustration of the 
issues at stake. The VDB had not included explicit educational prerequisites in its admission 
rules and did not introduce an entry examination until 1919. Instead, its entry requirements 
focused on experience, honour/integrity and an ability to demonstrate one’s competence (see 
above); they did not specify how these subjective qualities were to be assessed nor how the 
competence was to be demonstrated. In essence, they equated to an approval of the 
individual’s Sein, as described by Weber: to personal reputation and real or assumed culture 
of the kind exhibited for example by the educational and social events of the annual 
congresses. An exception to such subjective criteria was the admission of vereidigte 
Bücherrevisoren, who held Handelskammer accreditation and who were exempt from the 
requirement to demonstrate their competence.  
However, the Handelskammer conditions for licensing were also not primarily based on 
formal conditions and credentials. In general, Handelskammern had considerable discretion in 
selecting candidates, and initially, there was little consistency in policies for licensing 
(Meisel, 1992; Sponheimer, 1925).23 Usually, the Handelkammern would first establish 
whether there was a demand for (further) Bücherrevisoren (Anonymous, 1912b). If this was 
the case, applications were considered, based on candidates’ curricula vitae, previous 
activities/occupations, reputation and references (Pfahl, 1911). For example, in response to an 
unsuccessful candidate’s complaint, the Handelskammer in Leipzig stressed that ‘not only the 
applicants’ ability, but also a whole range of other criteria (personality, character, demand, 
etc.) are to be considered’ (my translation).24 
At its 1908 congress, the Association of Middle-German Handelskammern had set up a 
commission to consider whether these informal procedures were sufficient (Pfahl, 1911), and 
debated in particular the merits of an entry examination. This was not met with enthusiasm, 
and some Handelskammer representatives saw the only value of such an examination as a 
screening mechanism to exclude unwanted candidates on, de facto, other criteria (than the 
examination). For example:  
 
We are in general not enormously keen in this matter, because we place the 
main emphasis on the practice … that the Bücherrevisoren have in their work 
as bookkeepers or in some other way gained the necessary business 
competence. Therefore the examination would really for us, I am saying this 
openly, only be a means to remove unpleasant candidates, who absolutely 
	 31	
won’t be refused … We would never admit somebody … to the examination if 
we had not previously informed ourselves concerning his character; if we do 
not know that, apart from the examination, he has already proved himself. 
(Pfahl, 1911, p. 599, citing a representative of the Handelskammer in 
Magdeburg, my translation) 
 
In spite of this initial reluctance, and in line with the general trend towards formal credentials 
observed by Weber, business schools and universities gained ground in the education of 
Bücherrevisoren, and recognition by the Handelskammern, which soon relaxed other 
licensing conditions for academically qualified applicants (Anonymous, 1912b). By the late 
1920s the majority of entrants to audit-related activities – but crucially, not the majority of 
VDB members – had benefitted from some form of academic education (Markus, 1997, p. 12; 
Schroup, 1929).25  
Thus, while, as suggested above, cultural assets played an important part in middle 
class consciousness and in the development of professions, the emphasis had shifted from 
informal criteria based on shared lifestyles and respectability towards formal credentials, 
typically in the form of academic titles. Apart from the more direct implications for closure, in 
a society that valued academic credentials very highly, the new business school diplomas 
therefore had a potential impact on the VDB members’ social standing, in terms of Stand and 
social class. In a changing society, exclusivity based on Sein – on personal character, 
reputation and social interaction, associated with Gemeinschaft – was now replaced, as a 
means to monopolizing status and market advantages, by the Fachprüfung and the 
Bildungspatent. 
While such credentials may, on the surface, have appeared more transparent and 
meritocratic than the older order, the business schools had little actual effect on the average 
level of technical knowledge of graduates (Kocka, 1978). In fact, the academization 
associated with university and business school credentials owed more to a desire for upward 
social mobility than for better technical skills, and may in fact have contributed to greater – in 
Kocka’s (1978) view, excessive – social hierarchy creation and inequality. Facing these 
additional challenges to its status and its jurisdictions, the VDB now turned its attention back 
to cooperation with the Handelskammern.  
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Delegating Professional Closure 
 
Chua and Poullaos (1993, p. 691) challenge ‘the [neo-Weberian] assumption of a tightly 
defined concept of occupational “monopoly” or “closure” associated with a stable set of 
strategic imperatives’ and suggest that finer distinctions could ‘be made between “closure” of 
different types and at different levels’ (p. 694). Weber’s original concept of closure, and the 
associated imperatives, are, however, not narrowly defined. Weber notes that the degree of 
closure and the means through which it is achieved can vary widely (Weber, 1972, p. 24). 
Market relationships tend to be open, but openness and closure can alternate in social 
relationships – Weber refers to ‘the coexistence and opposition of expansionist and 
monopolist economic interests’. Expansion is encouraged when this is expected to benefit the 
group’s interests, and closure is pursued when monopolistic strategies are expected to 
improve its members’ opportunities (Weber, 1972, pp. 23, 201–203).26 Prior research on the 
accounting profession also observes the trade-off between drawing membership wide, which 
can be detrimental to reputation and (elite) status, and being too exclusive, which can 
encourage the creation of rival associations (Macdonald, 1995, p. 192; Ramirez, 2001; see 
also Edwards, Anderson & Chandler, 2005; Richardson, 1997; Walker & Shackleton, 1995). 
 The VDB had endeavoured to further its occupational interests by a variety of 
approaches. Internally, it had attempted to raise its members’ knowledge base, technical skills 
and status, and, through its membership requirements, had excluded specific groups that had 
been constructed as inferior. Externally, it had attempted to mobilize third parties in its 
pursuit of closure. Following its policy U-turn in 1902, when the VDB opted to represent 
rather than oppose vereidigte Bücherrevisoren, it had closely aligned itself with the 
Handelskammern – but with the expectation of remaining largely autonomous. It had 
expected to influence the licensing process and criteria (Anonymous, 1910; Gerhard, 1956, p. 
11) and thereby to gain the support of the Handelskammern in closing off market 
opportunities to those it considered disreputable or insufficiently qualified. In 1911, it had 
lobbied the state for legal protection of the title Bücherrevisor. As argued above, had this 
been successful, it would potentially have permitted usurpation of the privileges and 
monopolies of all vereidigte Bücherrevisoren (including non-VDB members). This might 
also have applied to tasks beyond those relating to Handelskammer appointments. It would 
also have reduced the VDB’s dependence on the Handelskammern. Demonstrating Parkin’s 
(1979, pp. 74–75) suggestion that usurpationary activities usually do not receive institutional 
and legal backing, this attempt had been unsuccessful.  
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One obstacle in its lobbying activities was a lack of critical mass. Membership 
initially grew only slowly, and in particular there remained a large number of vereidigte 
Bücherrevisoren whose (accredited) status and experience would have helped to raise the 
VDB’s reputation, but who were reluctant to join a body whose members’ knowledge and 
competence varied widely (Anonymous, 1906; Hintner, 1926; Quick, 1990).27 These 
vereidigten Bücherrevisoren would therefore not necessarily have gained status by joining 
the association, beyond that already conveyed by the Handelskammer appointment. The VDB 
commented critically: 
 
Regrettably many of our colleagues, in spite of repeated invitations, are still 
keeping away from our association, and not rarely do they disguise their 
indifference or misplaced selfishness with the motive, that our achievements to 
date do not suffice for them to cause them to join. (Anonymous, 1910, p. 517, 
my translation) 
 
The VDB therefore only represented a minority of all vereidigte Bücherrevisoren (see Table 
1 and note 27). 
Also, the impact on the Handelskammern’s licensing processes had remained limited, 
and the VDB now took a more direct approach in attempting to influence Handelskammern 
policies. From 1913 it made being licensed a condition of membership for new applicants 
(Anonymous, 1913). This reflected, in Weber’s terms, both expansionist and monopolist 
interests, and in Parkin’s terms a further attempt at both exclusionary and usurpationary 
closure. On the one hand, it was expected to assist in excluding unsuitable candidates 
(Anonymous, 1913; see also Gerhard, 1956; Schreier, 1925) and thereby to provide a 
competitive advantage in the audit market. This further supports Parkin’s suggestion that 
criteria defined in law (in this case relating to licensing by a semi-public bureaucratic 
authority) form the most effective means for excluding outsiders (see above).28 On the other 
hand, it was also expected that the change in admission rules would create stronger links with, 
and greater agency in relation to, the Handelskammern, and that this would result in attracting 
larger numbers of licensed members, and effectively make the VDB the body representing 
vereidigte Bücherrevisoren. 
However, the decision to restrict membership to vereidigte Bücherrevisoren meant 
that the VDB had yielded control over entry to the Handelskammern. In effect, the VDB 
failed to capture or even significantly affect Handelskammer policies, and this closer link 
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instead came at the price of reduced autonomy and the partial loss of control over entry. Also, 
a monopoly relating to work commissioned by the Handelskammern now virtually applied to 
the entire VDB membership, but did not represent closure for such work, since, to the 
leadership’s frustration, a considerable number of vereidigte Bücherrevisoren still chose not 
to join the VDB. The VDB remained small, and this limited its power as a party (in Weber’s 
sense) to obtain advantages (including power) for its leadership and membership. Further, 
only with regard to the Handelskammern work was any demarcation of tasks achieved; thus, 
any attempt at closure could relate only to this particular jurisdiction. While the reputational 
gain was expected to aid the VDB also in other areas, in particular in combating competition 
in the (voluntary) audit market, the requirement to work in sole practice meant that VDB 
members were unable to compete with the Treuhandgesellschaften in the market for larger 
clients. Also, a number of rival organizations were founded, representing diverging interests 
(Markus 1997, pp. 3–9; Meisel, 1992, pp. 129–150). For the VDB, rather than facilitating 
closure, as had been hoped when attempting to mobilize state agencies, this move in fact led 
to a situation where closure was effectively prevented.  
 
Discussion and Concluding Comments 
 
This paper examines the early history of the first association of German auditors. It draws on 
a variety of sources, primarily from the period under investigation, to track and interpret the 
VDB’s changing strategies in its attempt to secure (a degree of) social and professional 
closure. The VDB’s activities are interpreted through a theoretical lens based on Weber’s 
(1972) writings on closure and social stratification, and Parkin’s (1979) concept of dual 
closure. Drawing on Parkin (1979) as well as Weber adds perspective to the present study 
because Parkin articulates more explicitly than Weber the connections between stratification 
and closure, and the role of the state in both. Thus while Parkin’s interpretation and 
development of Weber’s theories allow me to explore the role of the state in the VDB’s 
history, utilizing also Weber’s ideas with regard to the dynamics of stratification provides 
deeper insights into the interplay of different levels of closure and openness at different 
times.  
This is partly the case because Weber’s ideas were developed in, and to some extent 
reflect, a particular historical and spacial context. The early history of the VDB therefore 
provides an interesting opportunity to explore a contemporaneous case through the lens of 
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Weber’s thoughts on closure and stratification. Drawing on Weber’s original text and 
language also illustrates better the congruity between the terminology used by Weber and in 
the VDB’s discourse and rhetoric. This applies in particular with regard to its early efforts to 
create a sense of common identity and to lay claim to specific lifestyles and to honour, 
integrity and status as a Berufsstand. Drawing on Weber’s writings on classes and Stände 
provides insights into how the VDB developed this sense of identity. It also helps to shed 
light on the tension between the VDB’s pursuit of status honour (or ständische Ehre) and 
market interests, and the relevance of both Stand and class consciousness to its activities. In 
fact, as argued by Harrits (2014, p. 4), Weber’s closure theory places greater emphasis on the 
connection between social (lifestyles and status) and economic (resources) characteristics 
than ‘traditional professional studies. The changing social and political context of the early 
twentieth century and the interplay and conflict between Ehre (status) aspirations and class 
(market) realities that can be observed in the VDB’s actions contribute to providing 
explanations for both its changing policies and its ultimate lack of success in achieving 
closure.  
One related factor in this lack of success was the changing role of credentials in early 
twentieth century Germany, and Weber’s observations on this also provide deeper insights 
into the experiences of the VDB. The creation, and increasing importance of diplomas also 
for auditing led, on the one hand, to increased competition (since the business schools and 
universities did not introduce enrolment limits), while on the other hand creating a new 
criterion on which closure could be based by competitors. In the German context, where 
academic credentials were held in high esteem, this was, in the long term, to prove a major 
obstacle for the VDB. Not only for the high status professions, but also for lower or semi-
professions (including engineering and auditing), were cognitive claims now increasingly 
identified with diplomas, rather than with subjective assessments of experience, character and 
reputation; diplomas replaced the latter as sources of status honour. Arguably formal, 
including academic, credentials are more easily administered and controlled (also by the 
state); as a corollary, Sein as the basis of admission to occupational interest groups becomes 
impractical once an organization has reached a certain size and Vergemeinschaftung has 
given way to Vergesellschaftung.  
This tension between the demands, for status aspirations, of exclusive 
Vergemeinschaftung, and of a critical mass sufficient to act as a political interest group 
(which, as noted above, always involves Vergesellschaftung) connects Weber’s writings on 
closure with those on formal credentials (Weber, 1972, pp. 201–203, 576–579). The tension 
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is also made explicit in the suggestion that the degree of closure and the means through 
which it is achieved can vary widely and that expansionist and monopolistic economic 
interests can coexist (Weber, 1972, pp. 23–24, 201–203); which of these is pursued at any 
given time depends on which is perceived to best serve the group’s interests. This is also 
reflected in the 1913 change in the VDB’s entry requirements, which made admission 
conditional on having been licensed. This resonates with Chua and Poullaos’ (1993) 
observation that, in order to obtain state privileges, an association may engage in a strategy 
that results in excluding some existing members while including new members, or may 
strategically forgo closure in some jurisdictions for closure in others. For the VDB, however, 
this meant that it lost control over a very significant condition of recruitment, thus limiting its 
critical mass and thereby its influence as a political interest group. It also, de facto, severely 
hindered its members’ ability to compete in the audit market, because of the 
Handelskammern’s requirement and its own ethos relating to independent sole practice. 
Ultimately, therefore, this attempt to gain state privileges did not have the desired 
consequences. Also, supporting Parkin’s theory, the earlier attempt to mobilize state 
authorities in the pursuit of usurpationary closure by seeking protection of the title 
Bücherrevisor, had been equally unsuccessful.  
The investigation of the early history of the VDB thus provides an opportunity to 
contribute to examinations of different types and degrees of closure attempts and different 
dynamics between closure and openness. This is important because professionalization is 
idiosyncratic, involving in different settings, different players that stand in different 
relationships to each other. The paper demonstrates that strategies and objectives are subject 
to change, and may also be ‘theoretically surprising or even anomalous’ (Chua & Poullaos, 
1993, p. 695). Thus the case allows us to observe a number of features that do not quite fit 
Weber or Parkin’s theories, including the (pre-emptive) action of a subordinate group before 
the better qualified, positively privileged had organized, and its subsequent take-over by 
representatives of the latter. The paper shows that, while the VDB had a degree of success in 
creating much of the structure and processes of a modern professional body (Markus, 1997, 
p. 6), its ambition to achieve market and professional closure was unsuccessful.29  
In summary, the paper has aimed to make a number of interrelated contributions. It 
has contributed to the literature on histories of professionalization in accounting an example 
of an incomplete professional project by tracking the shifting aims, and the life and ‘death’ 
(cf. Chua & Poullaos, 1993) of the VDB’s usurpationary and exclusionary closure strategies. 
More specifically, it has, with this case study of Germany in the economically and politically 
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turbulent decades preceding World War I, contributed to explorations of the conditions 
underlying unsuccessful professionalization projects, demonstrating that professionalization 
is ultimately an idiosyncratic process that is very much dependent on the local and historical 
context. While there are parallels with the development of other continental European audit 
and accounting professions (see, for example, Bocqueraz, 2001; De Beelde, 2002; Ramirez, 
2001), the German context differed in significant respects, in particular with regard to the 
role of the Handelskammern and that of academic credentials. The latter also reflect the 
tension between exclusive Vergemeinschaftung, and the Vergesellschaftung implicit in 
developing a necessary critical mass. This tension, in turn, reflects the pursuit of economic 
interests through, at times expansionist and at other times, monopolist strategies. 
The paper has also added to the very limited literature on the history of the audit 
profession in Germany and provided, to the best of my knowledge, the first in-depth 
exploration in accounting, of the foundation and early years of the first German association of 
auditors, and the first applying a theoretical framing informed by both Weber’s original texts 
and Parkin’s theory of dual closure. As discussed above, this is important because Parkin 
usefully develops Weber’s theories, but drawing also on Weber allowed me to provide deeper 
insights into the dynamics of stratification and of different levels of closure and openness at 
different times. It thus allowed me to contribute more nuanced insights into the balancing act 
between, and coexistence of, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, or expansionist and 
monopolistic economic interests, than drawing on only either Parkin or Weber would have 
permitted. Finally, the paper suggests, based on the story of the VDB, that potential insights 
may arise from applying theoretical frameworks developed in the same setting as the case to 
be explored. This also has implications for language and cultural translation and resonates 
with Mills’ (1993, p. 801) caution against applying modern theoretical frameworks in 
historical contexts. It reminds us and sensitizes us to the fact that theories are created in 
particular cultural and temporal settings and that classic works are also historical works. This 
means, for example, that they require regular re-translation (inter alia because of the effects 
of language change (Kalberg, 2001/2010), but that even with the best effort, ‘translations 
inevitably transform to some extent the original text’ (Humphrey & Gendron 2015, p. 52, on 
translations of Foucault). In general, it seems, that there is scope for further research in 
accounting history, on the implications of translating theories across time, cultures and 
languages (Evans, 2016).  
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Table	 1:	Membership	 of	 the	 VDB.	 Sources:	 Anonymous	 (1906,	 1913);	 Hintner	 (1926,	 pp.	 54–55);	 Schreier	
(1925,	p.	243);	Voß	(1930,	p.	32);	VDB	(1911/12,	1913-6). 
 
Year	 Full	
members	
Of	which	
licensed	
Not	licensed	 Male	 Female	 Additional	(not	
full	members)	
1896	 15	 	 	 	 	 	
	 44	
1901	 21	 	 	 	 	 	
1905	 152	 119	 33	 	 	 	
1906	 147	 	 	 	 	 	
1911	 265	 	 	 	 	 	
1912	 298	 252	 46	 	 	 	
1913	 317	 272	 45	 	 	 	
1916	 322	 288	 34	 	 	 	
1918	 355	 	 	 	 	 	
1919	 422	 	 	 	 	 	
1920	 605	 	 	 	 	 	
1921	 686	 	 	 	 	 	
1924	 828	 	 	 817	 11	 23	
 
 
																																																						
Notes 
1 Closure and stratification are mainly dealt with in Part II (the older part) of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 
(translated into English as Economy and society). Weber wrote this between 1909 and 1913. 
 
2 Thus Chua & Poullaos (1993, 1998) explore the distinctive case of colonial accountants engaging with both 
local and imperial state agencies; Ramirez (2001) focuses on interdisciplinary conflict between corporate audit 
firms and sole practitioners which were preceded by the similar events in the German setting, and Coronella et 
al. (2015) examine a post-unification Italian setting. While there are similarities, considerable diversity also 
exists in European settings and the development of European professions, in particular with regard to 
manifestations of third parties, including the state, and the role of and status associated with higher education 
(Abbott, 1988, p. 26; Macdonald, 1995, pp. 85–94). 	
 
3 While Ramirez (2001) draws on Bourdieu. 
4 The term freie Berufe is not restricted to university graduates, but refers to self-employed individuals only and 
therefore excludes civil servants or salaried employees (Jarausch, 1990; Kocka, 1990). Akademische Berufe 
refers only to professions requiring academic credentials (Jarausch, 1990) and ‘excludes those nineteenth-
century professionals who were not trained in universities or similar institutions (like the English barristers), and 
it does not carry with it the notion of autonomy and self-controlled closure which usually define [sic] the 
“professions”’ (Kocka, 1990, p. 62). See Jarausch (1990) for a fuller explanation of the German terms.  
5 As noted in the introduction, English translations such as ‘status group’ do not capture the German meaning 
fully and in particular do not signify very well the distinction between Stand and Klasse (‘class’) in German. 
Specifically,  
In German, the term Stand evokes a sense of medieval history. It also implies a focus on 
rights and responsibilities that members of a shared Stand have to each other, especially as 
expressed through commonalities of life and shared codes of behavior. Specifically in 
Weber’s formulation, these shared commonalities and responsibilities are mostly independent 
of any relationship within a free anonymous marketplace. According to Weber, this is an 
explicit contrast to the different feelings of solidarity and grievance that emerge from a shared 
position in a marketplace, as advantage-seeking buyers and sellers interact. Such groups 
Weber calls Klassen, that is, ‘social classes,’ in explicit contrast to the older solidarity of the 
Stände. (Waters & Waters, 2010, p. 155)  
6 Social classes comprise the working class; the lower middle classes; the unpropertied intelligentsia and the 
highly skilled; and the propertied class and those privileged through education (Bildung). Compared to other 
types of classes, social classes are distinguished by greater social mobility, for individuals or across generations 
(Weber, 1972, p. 177). Stand most closely relates to social class, and differs most from commercial classes. 
Stände are primarily created by propertied classes, but while Stand can be based on class situation, it is not 
solely determined by this (Weber, 1972, p. 180). 
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7 These translations also do not capture the German concepts well. See Waters & Waters (2010) for a full 
explanation 
8 Elsewhere, the foundation of professional associations was also motivated by attempts to break existing 
monopolies. This applied, for example, to the foundation of the Corporation of Accountants in Scotland in 1891 
(Walker, 1991). 
9 The Gewerbeordnung (§36) stressed that, where regulations attributed special credibility or legal significance 
to the actions of individuals practising the trades specified in this law, these attributes only applied to 
individuals appointed by the state or municipal authorities. 
10 The Deutsche Treuhand Gesellschaft was founded in 1890, initially as a finance and trust company for the 
protection of shareholders’ foreign investments (Meisel, 1992). From 1902, it included audit work in its service 
portfolio (Anonymous, 1914). In 1903 it carried out 27 external audits, and by 1907 approximately 400 (Quick, 
2005, with reference to Lansburgh, 1908). 
11 Unfortunately, no surviving documents shed light on whether this was due to existing members gaining a 
Handelskammer licence, or vereidigte Bücherrevisoren being newly admitted. 
12 Mimicking formal characteristics of older professions is a common feature of professionalization (Ramirez 
2001). For example, English accountancy drew on models of older professions when it developed attributes of 
professionalism (Abbott, 1988, p. 26; Robson, Willmott, Cooper & Puxty, 1994; Walker, 2004); local English 
societies emulated the organizational structures of Scottish societies (Macdonald, 1984; Walker, 2004); and the 
Institute of Accountants in New York (founded in 1882) attempted to imitate features of British accounting 
associations as well as the model of the ‘community of the competent’ employed in the medical profession, 
sciences and engineering in the US (McMillan, 1999).  
13 Perhaps because it was taken for granted, the VDB’s own original Articles of Association did not explicitly 
exclude women. In any case, by the mid-1920s the association had a small number of women members (see 
Table 1).  
14 In practice, Bücherrevisoren did delegate minor work to assistants.  
15 This difference in organizational form and personnel base was one of a number of factors that featured in the 
intra-professional struggle between Bücherrevisoren and Treuhandgesellschaften (Evans, 2003), which still had 
repercussions in the 1980s (Evans & Honold, 2007). See also Ramirez (2001) for somewhat later parallels in 
France. 
16 A similar link was created in France, as the claims of professional independence and competence associated 
with sole practice enhanced practitioners’ social prestige. This was because ‘independence and distance were 
indeed only attainable by those gifted with enough economic and social capital to advertise themselves as sole 
practitioners’ (Ramirez, 2001, p. 398). 
17 This problem appears to be symptomatic in most jurisdictions with a growing market where a professional 
organization has not developed sufficiently to facilitate closure. See, for example, Ramirez (2001) and Walker 
(1995).  
18 The schools were initially independent of the state, but soon gained university status and fell under state 
control (Lindenfeld, 1990).  
19 As evidenced by the emphasis on this topic at annual congresses. This was not only ‘proof that one was aware 
of a shortfall, but also that one was willing to remedy this’ (Sponheimer, 1925, p. 45, my translation). 
20 For example:  
 
Let us assume that a 19 year-old grammar school graduate attends the Handelshochschule for 
four semesters, passes the diploma examination and then completes the course for the training 
of Bücherrevisoren. We then have a young man of not yet 22 years of age, who has been 
officially certified as a Bücherrevisor. No doubt the young man is widely educated and 
possesses a wealth of desirable specialist knowledge – but he has absolutely no practical 
business experience. But that the latter plays a great, in fact the greatest role in the 
qualification of a Bücherrevisor, can be considered incontestable. (Anonymous, 1907b, p. 
218, my translation) 
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21 In addition, academic endeavours in other areas were perceived as a threat to the Bücherrevisoren’s 
jurisdictions. For example, Stern had published on industrial management and considered the valuation and 
depreciation of assets in manufacturing the domain of engineers.  
22 The Handelskammer Leipzig, however, had supported the introduction of the diploma at the 
Handelshochschule. (I am grateful to Sebastian Hoffmann for drawing my attention to this.) 
23 Although some regional associations of Handelskammern had established regulations on appointment and 
licensing by 1901 (Gerhard, 1956). 
24 Letter from the Handelskammer Leipzig to the Handeshochschule Leipzig, 12 May 1909. Archiv der 
Handeshochschule Leipzig, Reference 83/23. 
25 Its members’ lack of academic credentials was an obstacle to the VDB’s lobbying also in its later activities. 
Although elements of its membership began to interact with the business schools, and some prominent members 
took up teaching positions (Gerhard, 1956, p. 13), in the 1920s its application for recognition of 
Bücherrevisoren among the freie Berufe was nevertheless rejected because Bücherrevisoren ‘are not, nor need 
to be equipped with academic tools [to the same degree] as doctors, lawyers, engineers (who are not merely 
technicians)’ (Schreier, 1925, p. 235, citing the supreme fiscal court decision of 15 July 1924, emphasis added, 
my translation). Bücherrevisoren were thus contrasted with engineers, who had become academized to a larger 
extent (see above). This is significant because freie Berufe were traditionally not restricted to university 
graduates, and this decision therefore demonstrates the rise of the formal credentials – the Fachprüfungen – 
observed by Weber.  
26 Medieval guilds, for example, would at times attempt to increase membership to increase power, and at other 
times restrict membership to protect the value of their monopoly (Weber, 1972, p. 24). 
27 Hintner (1926) estimates the total number of Bücherrevisoren in the mid-1920s at around 2,000. However, 
Sponheimer (1925) estimates the number of vereidigte Bücherrevisoren at around 2,000, and that of unlicensed 
Bücherrevisoren at approximately 10,000. Census data for 1925 suggests that a total of 18,132 individuals were 
engaged in audit and taxation work, but this includes vereidigte Bücherrevisoren, unlicensed Bücherrevisoren 
and employees of Treuhandgesellschaften. The number of vereidigte Bücherrevisoren included in this total is 
estimated at approximately 1,800 (Schroup, 1929). The uncertainty regarding numbers is also noted, without 
resolution, by Henning (1990). It may partly be explained by the lack of a clear demarcation of the title and 
tasks of the Bücherrevisor. 
28 It also supports prior research that emphasizes the influence of the state and of third parties (vis-à-vis the 
market) in the development of continental European professions (see e.g., Burrage et al., 1990; Chua & 
Poullaos, 1998). 
29 This remained the case in subsequent years: post-World War I, several further attempts to gain state support 
to limit competition or create monopolies were unsuccessful. The VDB failed to convince, in the context of 
functionalist models of professions, of its public interest motives, and because the majority of its membership 
continued to lack formal academic credentials (Markus, 1997, pp. 12–13; Meisel, 1992, pp. 151–167; Schreier, 
1925, pp. 235–236). Economic crises and large-scale corporate collapses eventually led to the introduction, in 
1931, of an independent external audit and of a new professional title and qualification, the Wirtschaftsprüfer – 
both under state control (Markus, 1997; Meisel, 1992; Gietzmann & Quick, 1998). Although the VDB’s earlier 
lobbying had influenced developments (Markus, 1997; Meisel, 1992), and it initially perceived itself as the body 
representing the interests of the new Wirtschaftsprüfer (Gerhard, 1956, p. 38), to the VDB’s considerable 
disappointment, only around a third of its membership were admitted by September 1932 (Markus, 1997, p. 49).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
